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Charles T. Wolfe
Introduction
‘Frontier perspectives ’, in current sociological or social-historical language, are 
a family of approaches in which the relevant unit of analysis is frontiers, that 
is, social, political, or economic interactions at the ‘edges ’ of diff erent states. If 
the frontier becomes the relevant unit even in a comparative analysis – so the 
sug gestion goes – then we no longer need to have a nationalist historiography, 
an analysis in terms of nations or states.1 If we turn towards the discipline 
which concerns us here, intellectual history, Jonathan Israel has recently pro-
posed his own supra-national account of what he calls, after Margaret Jacob, 
the ‘radical Enlightenment ’ 2 – basically, Spinozism without Spinoza, or in 
other words, ‘Spinosism’ with an ‘s ’ rather than a ‘z ’, as a pan-national, un der-
ground intellectual movement throughout the Enlightenment. Th is is not the 
actual, textually complete Spinozist doctrine, but rather the collection of re-
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1. Peter C. Perdue, ‘A frontier view of Chineseness ’, in Th e resurgence of East Asia: 
500, 150 and 50 year perspectives, eds G. Arrighi, T. Hamashita & M. Selden (London, 
2003), p. 51.
2. Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the making of modernity 
1650–1750 (Oxford, 2001). Th e idea of distinguishing between Spinozism with a ‘z ’ and 
Spi nosism with an ‘s ’ (as in the Encyclopédie article ‘SPINOSISTES ’) was suggested by Ann 
Th om son at the conference on radical Enlightenment held at the ENS (Lyon) in February 
2004, the proceedings of which are forthcoming: Qu’ est-ce que les Lumières « radicales » ? 
Li bertinage, athéisme et spinozisme dans le tournant philosophique de l’ Âge classique, dir. 
C. Secretan, T. Dagron & L. Bove (Paris, 2007).
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verberations of various second-hand appropriations of Spinoza as a radical thin-
ker, throughout enlightened Europe.3 Like the ‘frontier perspective’, Israel ’s 
radical Enlightenment is meant to complement or perhaps even remedy the 
stu dy of ‘national ’ Enlightenments.
In what follows, I would like to look at two fi gures of this radical En ligh-
ten ment, of slightly unequal fame: the English deist Anthony Collins (1676–
1729), a fi gure chiefl y active in the fi rst quarter of the eighteenth century, 
and the French materialist Denis Diderot (1713–1784), who is roughly of the 
next generation. From a frontier perspective, or a supra-national perspective 
like Israel ’s, everything brings Collins and Diderot together, ils ont tout pour 
s’ en tendre, including their basic commitment to ‘Spinosism’ with an ‘s ’, and 
spe cifi cally, what concerns me here, the Spinozist claim according to which 
‘In the Mind there is no absolute, or free, will, but the Mind is determined to 
will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again 
by another, and so to infi nity ’, which can be supplemented with Spinoza’s 
state ment that ‘men believe themselves free because they are conscious of their 
own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined […] the 
decisions of the Mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which there-
fore vary as the disposition of the Body varies ’.4
Neither Collins nor Diderot are Laplacian determinists, unlike d ’Holbach, 
or in a more restricted sense, Hobbes. Th ey both recognise the specifi city of the 
mind, mental events and processes, and the need for the determinist to attend 
to this specifi city. In other words, a Spinozistic determinist emphasises a more 
specifi c kind of determination than a Laplacian determinist, who emphasises 
predictability, based on the laws governing the basic components of the uni-
verse and their interactions, and in that sense is purely a physicalist; the latter 
view, incidentally, is found prior to Laplace not only in d ’Holbach, but also 
in Condorcet.5 My claim in this essay will be that Collins and Diderot put 
3. Yves Citton’s L’ Envers de la liberté: L’ invention d’ un imaginaire spinoziste dans 
la France des Lumières (Paris, 2006) is a fascinating attempt to take Israel ’s model and 
re evaluate it in less historical terms, as an ‘invention of Spinozism’ in the Enlighten-
ment.
4. Spinoza, Ethics, II, p. 48; III, p. 2d.
5. See P.-S. Laplace, Essai philosophique sur les probabilités (1814; Paris, 1921), 
p. 3. Th e text was revised up until 1825, but Laplace had already presented the ideas in a 
lecture at the École Normale in 1795, and even earlier, had read a paper to the Académie 
des Sciences in 1772 on calculus and the ‘système du monde’, containing the germ of the 
pre sent passage. Condorcet ’s 1768 Lettre sur le système du monde contains an extremely 
si milar passage, as does d ’Holbach’s Système de la nature (I.iv), which appeared in 1770. 
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forth two very diff erent versions, or scenarios, of this Spinozist determinism 
– one more English, Lockean, and skeptical, the other more Continental and 
embodied; indeed, the latter amounts to an actual metaphysics, something 
that the English tended to treat with suspicion. Comparing these two authors 
on this topic should demonstrate that being a determinist, as part of the 
radical Enlightenment, meant something quite diff erent than it meant even 
in the early nineteenth century – a shade of meaning we seem to have retained 
until the present day – and indeed, that it meant two rather diff erent things 
on either side of the Channel. 
Collins ’s reception in the French radical Enlightenment was chiefl y me dia-
ted by Voltaire and d ’Holbach. Voltaire declared, specifi cally as regards free-
dom and determinism, that 
[…] cette question sur la liberté de l’ homme m’ intéressa vivement; 
je lus les scolastiques, je fus comme eux dans les ténèbres; je lus 
Locke et j’ aperçus des traits de lumière ; je lus le traité de Collins, 
qui me parut Locke perfectionné ; et je n’ ai jamais rien lu depuis 
qui m’ ait donné un nouveau degré de connaissance.6
As to d ’Holbach, he translated several of Collins ’ more polemical deistic works, 
on prophecy, the ‘grounds of the Christian religion’, and the contents of the jour-
nal Th e Independent Whig, in which Collins had published anonymously. How-
ever, the contrast I am interested in exploring is between Collins and Dide rot.
Collins ’ volitional determinism
Th e work of Collins which concerns us here is his Philosophical Inquiry Con-
cerning Human Liberty, published in 1717. Collins credits Locke, Bayle, Leib-
niz and Cicero as his chief infl uences, and also locates his work with respect 
to early eighteenth-century debates on the nature of evil – notably William 
King ’s De origine mali, later translated by the Lockean, Edmund Law. Not 
ex plicitly mentioned but clearly in the background are Hobbes, specifi cally, 
his debate with Bishop Bramhall on liberty and necessity, and Spinoza, whose 
Opera posthuma was in Collins ’ library, as well as Lucas ’ La vie et l’ esprit de 
A stu dy of proto-Laplacian determinism in the later part of the eighteenth century in 
France re mains to be written – but this would no longer be a ‘frontier ’ perspective in 
any sense.
6. Voltaire, ‘Le philosophe ignorant ’, § xiii, in Œuvres complètes, éd. L. Moland, vol. 
26 (Paris, 1879), p. 55.
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Spi noza. Collins also mentions Spinoza positively in his debate with Samuel 
Clarke, and the catalogue of his library indicates that he owned a great deal of 
clan destine literature: Vanini, Campanella, Cardano and Bruno, whose Spaccio
he had translated for his private usage, even if Toland ended up publishing the 
trans lation.7
However, the key intellectual fi gure in his life was Locke, who himself felt, 
as he wrote to Collins in his last year, that ‘I know nobody that understands 
[my book] so well, nor can give me better light concerning it […] ’ Locke also 
wished that if he were ‘setting out in the world ’ anew, he could have ‘a com pa-
nion as you […] to whom I might communicate what I thought true freely ’.8
Th e extent to which Collins ’ political and theological radicalisation of Locke 
would have been desired by Locke is an open, and interesting question, but 
can not be addressed here. I merely want to make clear that Collins ’ brand of 
de terminism, like the rest of his philosophy, including his debate with Samuel 
Clarke on matter and thought, is heavily conditioned by Lockean concepts. It 
should thus not be seen as merely a renewal or repetition of Hobbesianism, as 
has been claimed in a recent, and prominent study of liberty and necessity in 
eighteenth-century British thought.9
Indeed, the closeness between Locke and Collins reaches fairly unexpected 
le vels of pathos, with Locke declaring that ‘you are mistaken in me. I am not a 
yonge Lady a beauty and a fortune’. Collins, for his part, responded that: 
I am not mistaken in you, for though you are not a Young Lady a 
Beau ty and a fortune Yet I have more satisfaction and pleasure in 
your friendship than I can hope for from those qualifi cations only 
7. See James O ’Higgins, Determinism and freewill: A. Collins’ A Philosophical In-
qui ry Concerning Human Liberty (Th e Hague, 1976), p. 36–37. Collins, An Answer 
to Mr Clarke’ s Th ird Defence, printed in vol. 3 of Th e Works of Samuel Clarke, 4 vols. 
(1738; reprint, New York, 1978); A Complete Catalogue of the Library of Anthony Collins
(London, 1731). On Collins, Toland and Bruno see Margaret C. Jacob, Th e Newtonians 
and the English Revolution (Ithaca, 1976), p. 245; Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p. 615.
8. Locke to Collins, letters 3504 (April 3rd 1704) and 3361 (October 29th 1703), 
re spectively, in Locke, Correspondence, ed. E.S. De Beer, vol. 8 (Oxford, 1976–1989), p. 
263, 297. 
9. James A. Harris, in Of Liberty and Necessity: Th e Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-
Century British Philosophy (Oxford, 2005), p. 13, 55–58, describes Collins as a return to 
Hobbes, which was in fact the mainstream nineteenth-century view. I agree instead with 
Pe ter N. Miller, ‘Freethinking and “Freedom of Th ought ” in Eighteenth-Century Britain’, 
His torical Journal 36:3 (September 1993), for whom Locke was ‘the most profound in fl u-
ence on Collins ’ (p. 609).
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[…]. If I fall into the strain of a Lover, it is from motives that arise 
with in me, and that are not in my power to prevent. You must 
cease to be what you are; nay you must never have been what you 
have been, to destroy that disposition of mind that has so much 
me rit for its foundation. […] You […] who while in town are so 
Young, Lusty and Willing.
Locke wrote later: 
I have long since surrendered myself to you. […] I am your captive 
by the soft but stronger force of your irresistible obligations, and 
with the consent and joy of my own mind. Judge then whether 
I am willing my shadow should be in the possession of one with 
whom my heart is and to whom all that I am, had I any thing be-
side my heart worth the presenting, does belong. […] 
Finally, in a letter he wished to be delivered to Collins after his death, declaring 
‘I know you loved me living ’.10 Such language demonstrates, at the very least, 
an unusual degree of intellectual intimacy between these two philosophers.
Th is closeness is also visible in their ideas on determinism. Locke, in the 
chap ter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding on ‘Power ’ (book II, 
chap ter xxi),11 had put forth a very complex critique of the idea of free will. Its 
com plexity is in good part due to Locke’s inclusion in the chapter of each state 
of his evolving views on the topic, as he revised the Essay. Notably, beginning 
in the second edition, Locke abandoned his initial view that our will is de ter-
mined by the greater good, and puts forth a new category, ‘uneasiness ’:
[Uneasiness] is the great motive that works on the Mind to put it 
up on Action, which for shortness sake we will call determining of 
the Will (Essay, II.xxi, §29);
[W]hat […] determines the Will in regard to our actions is not 
[…] the greater good in view: but some (and for the most part the 
most pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under (§31);
10. Locke to Collins, March 21st/24th 1704, letter 3498, p. 253, 255 (spelling un-
changed); Collins to Locke, March 30th 1704, letter 3500, p. 258; Locke to Collins, August 
16th 1704, letter 3613, p. 378; Locke to Collins, August 23rd 1704 (but delivered as 
Locke as ked, after Locke’s death, October 28th), letter 3648, p. 417 (all in Correspondence, 
vol. 8).
11. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690, 5th ed. 1701], ed. 
P. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975) (quoted directly by book, chapter and paragraph number).
CHARLES T. WOLFE42
[G]ood, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged 
to be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised pro-
por tionately to it, make us uneasy in the want of it (§35).
But Locke, perhaps afraid of the deterministic consequences of this kind of he-
do nism, in which my actions are almost entirely motivated (or determined) by 
my most pressing uneasiness, reintroduces a kind of unconditioned moment 
in this schema, which he calls the ‘suspension of desire’, a refl exive, second-
order relation to the various pressing desires or uneasinesses:
For, the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, 
a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its 
de sires; and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the 
ob jects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with 
others. In this lies the liberty man has; […] we have a power to sus-
pend the prosecution of this or that desire; as every one daily may 
ex periment in himself. Th is seems to me the source of all liberty; 
in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) 
called free-will. For, during this suspension of any desire, before 
the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows 
that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, 
and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; […] 
(Essay, II.xxi, §47).
Th is is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, 
in their constant endeavours after, and a steady prosecution of 
true felicity,- Th at they can suspend this prosecution in particular 
cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves 
whe ther that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lie 
in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is 
their greatest good. […] experience showing us, that in most cases, 
we are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire (§52).
Th is is what Collins is going to react to, in contrast to his otherwise quite 
Lockean outlook. He bluntly declares at the beginning of his Inquiry12 (p. i–ii) 
that he will be ‘denying liberty ’ in most senses of the word, adding later on 
12. Collins, A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (London, Robinson, 
1717; reprinted in O ’Higgins, Determinism and freewill and as a separate edition (New 
York, 1976), p. i–ii).
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that ‘the common notion of liberty is false’ (p. 22) and ‘if a cause be not a 
necessary cause, it is no cause at all’ (p. 58). Given his ‘causal axiom’ – that 
all actions have a beginning, and everything that has a beginning has a cause, 
hen ce all actions are caused necessarily (p. 59) –  he cannot accept the idea of 
sus pension.
Collins asks if we are free to will or not will, and answers ‘No’: ‘we have 
not that liberty ’ (p. 37). If an action which is in our power suggests itself to 
us, e.g., going for a walk, the will to go or not to go for a walk exists right away. 
Th e same is true if someone asks if I would like to go for a walk tomorrow: my 
will responds immediately (p. 38). I can either will that which is off ered to me, 
not will it (but precisely, ‘I do not want to go for a walk ’ does not mean ‘I have 
no will at all ’ but rather ‘I will not go for a walk ’ or more technically, ‘I will to 
not go for a walk ’), or defer willing, which again means to ‘have a will to defer 
wil ling about the matter proposed ’ (p. 38). As soon as someone asks if I wish 
to go for a walk, I have no choice but to will. Even when I reject all alternatives 
that are off ered to me, my decision is still a volition.
Th is is Collins ’s fi rst explicit criticism of Locke. Th e moment of sus pen-
sion of the execution of our desire is a ‘moment of freedom’ which Collins 
re jects.13 He explains that Locke’s mistake is a verbal one, concerning the 
fu ture tense: if I choose to put off  my decision to go for a walk – Collins 
mag nifi es the exam ple here, so that it becomes ‘going to France or Holland ’ 
(Inquiry, p. 39, 52) – it does not mean that my willing has actually been 
sus pended, since my will has exercised its power in any case. As he puts it, 
‘sus pending to will is it self an act of willing ’, it is, as he repeats, ‘wil ling 
to defer willing about the mat ter propos ’d ’ (p. 39, author ’s emphasis).14
Re call that Locke’s doctrine of suspension appeared to reintroduce an un-
caused, ‘libertarian’ component in to an otherwise coherent determinism of 
‘un easiness ’. Indeed, Locke was al ways quite explicit about suspension being 
vo luntary; he spoke of ‘hold[ing] our wills undetermined ’ (Essay, II.xxi.52) 
until we have examined the possible cour ses of action, a formulation which 
13. Indeed, it may well be that this is from Malebranche. See Gideon Yaff e, ‘Locke on 
Sus pending, Refraining and the Freedom to Will ’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 18:4 
(2001), p. 387, n. 2. Concretely, Malebranche had declared that ‘the power of suspending 
jud gment [ …] is the principle of our liberty ’ (Traité de la nature et de la grâce, III, i, 13, 
in Œuvres, éd. G. Rodis- Lewis, vol. 2 [Paris, 1992], p. 117).
14. Th is is also Leibniz ’s objection to Locke’s notion of suspension, in the New Essays 
on Human Understanding, ed. & trans. P. Remnant & J. Bennett (Cambridge, 1982), 
II.xxi.47.
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is open to Collins ’ critique. Th e pro blem does not lie in the chain of events 
that gives rise to suspension, but in the pur portedly undetermined nature of 
the state of suspension once we are in it.
Collins takes over much of Locke’s critique of free will but he rejects the in-
tro duction of ‘suspension’. We are never fully free because we are always willing: 
this is a psychologically sophisticated determinism, or, to put it diff erently, a de-
terminism which recognises the specifi c nature of volitions: it is a volitional de-
terminism.15 Indeed, Collins, for all his neat Spinozistic causal closure, ne ver-
theless maintains a form of compatibilism, more specifi cally, a position closely 
re sembling what used to be called the ‘Hume-Mill thesis ’, according to which 
‘an act [is] free insofar as the agent ’s motives or drives are a link in its causal 
chain’, and ‘these motives or drives may themselves be as rigidly determined 
as you please’.16 It is rarely, if ever noted that Collins formulates this position 
be fore Hume; his own term for it is ‘moral necessity ’:
I contend only for what is called moral necessity, meaning there by, 
that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined 
by his reason and his senses; and I deny man to be subject to 
such ne cessity, as is in clocks, watches and other beings which 
for want of sensation and intelligence are subject to an absolute, 
physical or me chanical necessity (Collins, Inquiry, p. iii; emphasis 
mine).
Later, after a long critique of freedom as indiff erence, Collins says that even in 
such an apparently indiff erent situation such as choosing between two eggs,
[…] all the various modifi cations of the man, his opinions, pre-
ju dices, temper, habit and circumstances are to be taken in and 
con sidered as causes of election no less than the objects without 
us among which we choose (p. 47).
15. I borrow this term from Vere Chappell, ‘Locke on the Freedom of the Will ’, in 
Chappell (ed.), Locke (Oxford, 1998), p. 86, but use it in a diff erent sense. He uses it like 
the older term ‘psychological determinism’, to refer to Locke’s doctrine of action as de ter-
mined by the will; I extend the term to mean a type of determinism which allows for, in-
deed focuses on, volitions and other mental acts, in contrast to a ‘physicalist ’ determinism 
which denies the existence of this level of action, or at least seeks to reduce it to a lower-
level explanation.
16. W. V. O. Quine, ‘Th ings and their place in theories ’, in P. K. Moser & J. D. Trout 
(eds), Contemporary Materialism (London, 1995), p. 199 (he attributes this view to Spi-
no za and Hume).
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Th us ‘it is contrary to experience to suppose any choice can be made under an 
equa lity of circumstances ’ (p. 52). But what is determining our choice is not par-
ti cularly the beating of the wings of a butterfl y in China, but these specifi cally 
‘mo ral ’ (aff ective, volitional) causes. Collins ’ insistence on distinguishing two 
kinds of necessity is a skilful maneuver faced with opponents such as Samuel 
Clarke, who from his Boyle Lectures onwards had asserted ‘moral necessity ’ 
for the opposite reason, precisely to defend the moral realm against any en-
croach ment of physicalistic reductionism:
Th e necessity by which the power of acting follows the judgment 
of the understanding is only a moral necessity, that is, no necessity 
at all in the sense wherein the opposers of liberty understand li-
ber ty. For moral necessity is evidently consistent with the most 
per fect natural liberty.17
In contrast, Collins presents liberty and necessity as ‘consistent ’ in the In-
quiry. Clarke will of course be quite unhappy with this revised version of the 
con cept of moral necessity, which he views as collapsing our determination 
by our de sires, emotions and beliefs into mere ‘motions of a clock ’, as he says 
in his fi rst Boyle Lecture (A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of 
God, p. 64). He returns to this opposition between the ‘free’ human power 
of self-motion and this blind mechanical necessity in his controversy with 
Collins on matter and thought, known as the Letter to Dodwell – stating 
that if thinking were a mode of matter, every thinking being, including God, 
would be governed by ‘absolute necessity, such as the motion of a clock or a 
watch is determined by ’18 – and later, in correspondence with Leibniz. Cu-
riously, when Clarke re sponds to Collins ’ usage of the clock metaphor in his 
1717 remarks on the In quiry, he appears to grant that the only diff erence 
be tween a human being and a clock is that the former has sensation and 
in telligence (whereas the latter does not), but then adds that sensation and 
intelligence are not the power of act ion. Th at is, it is not the having of sen sa-
tion or intelligence which makes the diff erence, since ‘the pulsation of the 
heart, though joined with sensation, is yet as necessary a motion as that of 
17. Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (First Boyle 
Lec ture, 1705), § X, in A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and Other 
Writings, ed. E. Vailati (Cambridge, 1998), p. 73 (emphasis mine); for Collins ’ retort, see 
Inquiry concerning Human Liberty, p. 112.
18. Clarke, A Th ird Defense of an Argument made use of in A letter to Mr. Dodwell, 
in Th e Works of Samuel Clarke, vol. 3, p. 851.
CHARLES T. WOLFE46
a clock ’, such that the pulsations of the heart ‘are no more an action of the 
man, than the other is of the clock ’.19
From our standpoint, which focuses on Collins, the point is that the only 
di ff erence between a human being and a clock is that the former has sensation 
and intelligence, which are the grounds for it being governed by a specifi cally 
‘mo ral ’ necessity. Both the cogs of a clock in relation to the clock as a whole, 
and my desires, attitudes, or beliefs in relation to my ‘acting ’ as a whole, are 
cau sally linked. Th ere is no less causality in the latter case than in the former. 
How ever, Collins sidesteps the issue of reductionism, whether ontological or 
ex planatory, because he deliberately remains at the strictly psychological level, 
ne ver inquiring into how it is that a deterministically driven agent in a causal 
world might also be a natural agent.
Th is is precisely what Diderot will want to address, declaring, ‘What a dif-
fe rence there is, between a sensing, living watch and a golden, iron, silver or 
cop per watch! ’ 20 La Mettrie had famously stated in the opening paragraphs 
of L’ Homme-Machine that the question, ‘can matter think? ’ is tantamount 
to asking ‘can matter tell time? ’, and he later seeks to exploit, for materialist 
pur poses, the celebrated clock metaphor which appears in countless texts of 
the period.21 What is both interesting and confusing about this metaphor, 
ac tually an analogy, is that it can be understood as a mechanistic analogy or 
as a strictly functional analogy (thought is a functional property of organized 
beings, like telling time is for clocks), as has been clearly pointed out by Timo 
Kai taro.22 In contrast, if we think back to the debate between Collins and 
19. Clarke, ‘Remarks on a book, entitled, A Philosophical Inquiry into Human 
Li ber ty’, in Th e Works of Samuel Clarke, vol. 4, p. 722;  Clarke, Demonstration of the 
Being and Attributes of God and Other Writings, p. 133. In response to one of the letters 
from ‘an Anonymous Gentleman of Cambridge’, Clarke adds that Collins ’ distinction 
between moral and physical necessity, with the example of a scale, is misleading, be -
cause in the end Collins ’ ‘moral necessity ’ has us be just as determined as a scale is by 
its weights.
20. Éléments de physiologie, in Diderot, Œuvres complètes, éd. H. Dieckmann, J. 
Proust & J. Varloot (Paris, 1975–), vol. 17, p. 335;  Diderot, Œuvres, éd. L. Versini, vol. 
1: Philosophie (Paris, 1994), p. 1283.
21. La Mettrie, Œuvres philosophiques, éd. F. Markovits (Paris, 1987), vol. 1, p. 63; 
Descartes, Principes, IV, §203, in Œuvres, éd. Adam-Tannery (Paris, 1964–1974), vol. 
11, p. 321–322; Description du corps humain, vol. 11, p. 226; Discours de la méthode, § 
V, vol. 6, p. 57, 59, and Samuel Formey, Recherches sur les éléments de la matière (1747), 
§ XLV, LV, in Mélanges philosophiques (Leyden, Élie Luzac, 1754).
22. Kaitaro, ‘“Man is an admirable machine” – a dangerous idea’, in M. Saad (dir.), 
Mé canisme et vitalisme: La lettre de la Maison française d’ Oxford, vol. 14 (special issue, 
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Clarke as to the diff erence between the motions of a clock, and the pulsations 
of the heart, Diderot ’s point is that a robust determinism must in fact take 
ac count of the specifi cities of organic or ‘organised ’ beings – while remaining 
a determinism.
Diderot ’s embodied determinism
Diderot, like Fontenelle – in the latter ’s clandestine Traité de la liberté de 
l’ âme, writ ten in 1700 but only published, anonymously, in 1743 – but 
on a more em pirical plane, considers that mental faculties such as memory 
and the will are processes which turn out to be cerebral processes: ‘Man’s 
key characteristics lie in his brain, not in his external constitution’, so that, 
e.g. ‘in order to ex plain the mechanism of memory we have to examine the 
soft substance of the brain’.23 He also denies that there is any fundamen-
tal diff erence between rea soning or internal contemplation, and sensation: 
‘[T]here is only one ope ra tion in man: sensing, and this operation is never 
free’.24 Th is can be seen as a continuation of the Lockean emphasis on he-
do nism qua determinism, pre cise ly as in Collins, but being a materialist he 
is not con tent to leave the story there. In Le Rêve de D’ Alembert, he will 
provide hints, esquisses of a biological or perhaps biologistic theory of self, 
in which selfhood is derived from the func tioning of the central nervous 
system, and the will is longer a faculty with a capital F but rather a part of 
the cognitive functions of an animal as a whole. Th us ‘there can be no ra-
tional goodness or wickedness, although there can be an animal goodness or 
wickedness […]’. 25
Briefl y put, Diderot is initially a hard determinist, declaring ‘there is on ly 
one kind of causes […]: physical causes ’, ‘the physical world and the mo ral 
world are one and the same’, or, lastly, ‘the moral world is so intimately tied 
to the physical world that it appears both are really one and the same ma-
2001), p. 117 and more broadly, Sidney Shoemaker, ‘Some varieties of functionalism’, in 
Iden tity, Cause and Mind (Cambridge, 1984), p. 266.
23. Éléments de physiologie, in Diderot, Œuvres complètes, vol. 17, p. 326, 470.
24. Franz Hemsterhuis / Denis Diderot, Lettre sur l’ homme et ses rapports, avec le 
com mentaire inédit de Diderot, éd. G. May (New Haven & Paris, 1964), p. 155 [59a]; 
Di derot, Œuvres, ed. Versini, vol. 1, p. 717.
25. Diderot, s.v. ‘DROIT NATUREL (Morale) ’, in Diderot & D ’Alembert (dir.), En cyclo-
pé die raisonnée des sciences, des arts et des métiers (reprint, Stuttgart & Bad Cannstatt, 
1966), vol. 5, 115b. No tice that he is not denying the existence of goodness or wickedness 
(a view which he at tributes to La Mettrie).
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chine’.26 Yet later, when critiquing Helvétius, he grows dissatisfi ed with the 
lack of specifi city of such explanations, and declares that ‘I am a man, and I 
re quire causes proper to man’.27 It is comments like these which lead me to 
stress that Diderot is not what I have termed a Laplacean determinist: yes, the 
universe is a causally closed whole, but within that whole Diderot wants spe-
ci fi c explanatory and indeed ontological strata (‘causes proper to man’). Th e 
idea that in a causally closed universe, there might be causes ‘proper to man’ 
may sound a bit like moral necessity, as distinguished from the necessity of the 
mo tions of a clock; but the novelties are that:
(a) Th is is linked up with the concept of organisation and the notion of 
or ganic continuity rather than mere contiguity, on which it is premised.28
Ve ry summarily, one could say that the term organisation was used in the 
same way as the term ‘organism’, which only became current in French (or 
Ger man) by the 1800’s, even though Leibniz had introduced it into French in 
the early 1700’s. It referred to our bodily constitution inasmuch as it displayed 
fea tures which were not present in machines, such as self-regulation, or the 
‘sym pathy ’ between the organs which the Montpellier vitalists insisted on so 
emphatically. However, the concept of  ‘organisation’ is compatible with me-
cha nistic, reductive explanations in a way that the concept of  ‘organism’, es pe-
cial ly in its Kantian and Romantic reinterpretations, is not.
Th e diff erence between the life of an organic being and the life of a woo-
den automaton, or a watch, is not that the former possesses a soul, or is free, 
whereas the latter is not. Th e diff erence is, one might say, a structural one, 
be tween two diff erent types of arrangements of parts. But notice that my or-
ga nisation is not a substructure on which I supervene as a person or an in di vi-
dual; it is my individuality.
(b) Inasmuch as I am an organic being, I am modifi able or corrigible, like 
the dog which recognises the stick with which its master had beaten it,29 but I 
26. Letter to Landois, in Diderot, Œuvres complètes, vol. 9, p. 258; Paradoxe sur le 
comédien, in Œuvres complètes, vol. 20, p. 53; ‘Dieu et l ’homme’ (an unpublished review 
of a 1771 book of that title by Pierre-Louis Sissous de Valmire, intended for Grimm’s 
Correspondance littéraire), in Œuvres complètes, vol. 20, p. 655.
27. Diderot, Œuvres, éd. Versini, vol. 1, p. 796.
28. See Karl M. Figlio, ‘Th e metaphor of organisation: an historiographical perspective 
on the bio-medical sciences of the early 19th century’, History of Science 14 (1976).
29. Respectively, (i) Diderot, s.v. ‘MODIFICATION ’, Encyclopédie, vol. 10, p. 602a / 
Diderot, Œuvres, éd. Versini, vol. 1, p. 479 (a more elaborate version is at p. 665); (ii) Jac-
ques le fataliste, in Diderot, Œuvres complètes, vol. 23, p. 190 (Leibniz had remarked that 
when the master raises a stick, the dog fears a blow [New Essays, II.xi.11]; see also Hume, A 
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am also a unity, a unifi ed whole: ‘Regardless of the multitude of causes which 
con curred to make me what I am, I am a single cause [une cause une]’ 30.
(c) All of this is connected to Diderot ’s brief but dense article in the En cy-
clo pédie entitled ‘SPINOSISTES ’, in which ‘modern Spinosists ’ are distinguished 
from ‘ancient Spinosists ’ because the former specifi cally assert a metaphysics of 
li ving matter, tied to the new theory of biological epigenesis:
SPINOSISTE, s. m. (Gram.) sectateur de la philosophie de Spinosa. 
Il ne faut pas confondre les Spinosistes anciens avec les Spinosistes 
mo der nes. Le principe général de ceux-ci, c ’ est que la matière est 
sensible, ce qu’ils démontrent par le développement de l’œuf, corps 
inerte, qui par le seul instrument de la chaleur graduée passe à 
l’état d’être sen tant & vivant, & par l’accroissement de tout animal 
qui dans son prin cipe n’est qu’un point, & qui par l’assimilation 
nutritive des plan tes, en un mot, de toutes les substances qui servent 
à la nutrition, de vient un grand corps sentant & vivant dans un 
grand espace. De-là ils concluent qu’il n’y a que de la matière, 
& qu’elle suffi  t pour tout expliquer ; du reste ils suivent l’ancien 
spinosisme dans toutes ses con sé quences.31
Modern ‘Spinosists ’, in other words, are materialists for whom the biological 
is the reducing theory; faced with metaphysical dualism, with the concept of 
soul, or self, or personal identity, they respond by subjecting such phenomena 
to the conceptual ‘fi lter ’ of the emerging biological sciences. What it is to 
be me is to have my unique organisation; it is governed by biological laws 
– although Diderot, a stalwart Lucretian, is more interested in how natural 
forms suddenly arise and then are ‘exterminated ’, than in stability or law-like 
be havior.
So the one key diff erence between Collins ’ determinism and Diderot ’s is 
the specifi cally ‘embodied ’ fl avour of the latter; but in addition, Diderot also re-
Treatise of Human Nature, ed. D. F. Norton [Oxford, 2000], I.iii.16); (iii) Hemsterhuis / 
Di derot, Lettre sur l’ homme, p. 285 [124a] / Diderot, Œuvres, éd. Versini, vol. 1, p. 737.
30. Hemsterhuis / Diderot, Lettre sur l’ homme, p. 157 [60a] ;  Diderot, Œuvres, éd. 
Versini, vol. 1, p. 718. Jacques Chouillet ’s essay ‘Des causes propres à l ’homme’, in Ap-
proches des Lumières: Mélanges off erts à Jean Fabre (Paris, 1974) remains the best com men-
ta ry on Diderot ’s changing understanding of causes and determinism.
31. Diderot, s.v. ‘SPINOSISTES ’, in Diderot & D ’Alembert (dir.), Encyclopédie, vol. XV, 
p. 474a. See the penetrating analysis by Alexandre Métraux, ‘Über Denis Diderots Phy sio-
lo gisch Interpretierten Spinoza’, Studia Spinozana 10 (1994).
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turns to a more basic Spinozist claim (now spelled with a ‘z ’), namely, that we 
are parts of one vast interlocking system of bodies and their transforma tions, 
and nothing else besides; this is what he calls ‘le Tout ’, with statements such as 
this one, from the Rêve de D’ Alembert: ‘tout change, tout passe […] il n’y a que 
le tout qui reste’. Hence (from the Éléments de physiologie) ‘A volition without 
a cause is a chimera. Nothing occurs in Nature through leaps; everything there-
in is connected ’.32 Diderot did not see a contradiction in between being a 
de terminist – if, admittedly, of an ‘expanded ’ sort – and denying that the 
world reduces to predictable, mechanical laws, because of his vision of living 
mat ter in perpetual transformation. Th us what is so paradoxical about his tur-
ning ‘Spinozism’ into a metaphysics of living matter: neither a determinist 
in general, nor a Spinozist in particular, can really accept the existence of a 
qua litative discontinuity between living matter and dead matter, or, which 
amounts to the same thing, the attribution of animate properties to all of 
matter.
Conclusion
Collins ’ volitional determinism radicalises Locke by extending his notion of 
‘uneasiness ’ while rejecting ‘suspension’. He thereby imposes a notion of cau-
sal closure, while at the same time restricting himself to the domain of the 
mind. Not only does he not make any pronouncements on the ultimate nature 
of reality, or the physical universe. Collins also avoids making any explicit 
re ductionist claims about the physical basis of mental activity, including vo li-
tion, which should remind us of Locke’s declaration at the beginning of the 
Essay, that ‘I shall not at present meddle with the Physical consideration of 
the Mind ’.33 Skeptical and nominalistic strains here precisely do not entail 
a metaphysically realist claim about the place of our minds in a (natural) cau-
sal world. In contrast, Diderot, in this respect following a literally more ‘san-
guine’ strain of realism in the French clandestine tradition of Fontenelle, Fré-
ret, and La Mettrie, among others, asserts that we are agents inasmuch as we 
are complex organisms conditioned by and interacting with a host of other 
bo dies, in a natural causal world.
Admittedly, one can produce counter-examples to this distinction between 
an English ‘skeptically motivated ’ determinism and a French ‘metaphysically 
32. Respectively, Diderot, Œuvres, éd. Versini, vol. 1, p. 631, and Œuvres complètes, 
vol. 17, p. 483.
33. Locke, Essay, I.i.2.
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mo tivated ’ determinism: in the earlier generation, both Hobbes and Spinoza 
share a strong commitment to causality, and in contrast, the clandestine tra-
dition tends to emphasise a posteriori claims for the rule of necessity, based 
on experience. But if we examine the Wirkungsgeschichte of Collins and 
Diderot, a certain kind of pattern, if not a teleology, appears: Collins ’s spe ci-
fi cally volitional determinism leads to Priestley, Mill, and associationist psy-
cho logy. Hume, too, belongs in this trajectory, except that some of the ideas 
we associate with him can actually be traced back to Collins, notably moral 
ne cessity. Diderot ’s embodied determinism, in contrast, leads to the biological 
theo rising of Cabanis, Bichat, and Bernard.
Now, neither Collins nor Diderot reduce all necessity to physical necessity: 
Col lins insists on the concept of moral necessity, and Diderot is equally com-
mitted to fi nding ‘causes proper to man’. To use the distinction I formulated 
earlier, both are Spinozist determinists rather than Laplacean determinists. 
But – in a return to a ‘pre-Israel ’ analysis of what the Enlightenment is – the 
English variant of Spinozistic determinism restricts itself to the realm of the 
mind and its ‘furniture’, whereas the French variant locates all of this within 
a biologistically driven, and directed, realist metaphysics of living matter – a 
meta physics which is more Leibnizian than Lockean; more Continental, once 
again. It would appear as if there were quasi-national boundaries between 
types of determinism in the radical Enlightenment, after all.
